Washita Battlefield National Historic Site ⓘ

The approximately 1,000 volume library focuses on the Battle of Washita and includes subjects on the Southern Plains Indians, American Indian cultures, the US Army, the flora and fauna of the Great Plains, the National Park Service, and the US Forest Service.

The library is open to the public by appointment only. Please email or call us at (580) 497-2742 for further information.

Custer, Black Kettle, and the fight on the Washita (aka Conquest of the Southern Plains) by Charles J. Brill

A Hoosier Quaker Goes to War: The Life & Death of Major Joel H. Elliott, 7th Cavalry by Sandy Barnard

Campaigning with Custer and the Nineteenth Kansas Volunteer Cavalry on the Washita Campaign, 1868-69 by David L. Spot

The Moccasin Speaks: Living as Captives of the Dog Soldier Warriors by Arlene Feldmann Jauken

The Cheyenne Way: Conflict and Case Law in Primitive Jurisprudence by K.N. Llewellyn and E. Adomson Hoebel

Searching for Sacred Ground: The Journey of Chief Lawrence Hart, Mennonite by Raylene Hinz-Penner

Tribal Sovereignty and the Historical Imagination: Cheyenne-Arapaho Politics by Loretta Fowler

Tell Me, Grandmother: Traditions, Stories, and Culture of Arapaho People by Virginia Sutter

April 17th, 1867 Conflict on the Southern Plains between Native Americans and the U.S. Army had been occurring for years. The Sand Creek Massacre in 1864 had resulted in the death of many innocent Cheyenne women and children, and likewise retaliatory attacks by Cheyenne “Dog Soldiers” had caused havoc on homesteads in Colorado and Kansas. To create a greater understanding of the Battle of the Washita that later occurred in 1868, it is important to analyze the events that led up to it.

In the spring of 1867, in response to Dog Soldier attacks on the frontier, General Winfield Hancock led 1,400 soldiers in a campaign of intimidation. The goal was to intimidate the Dog Soldiers, a fierce band of warriors mainly comprising Cheyennes but also other groups including Arapaho and Lakota. The Dog Soldiers had been raiding the Great Plains in retaliation for the Sand Creek Massacre that occurred in 1864. Included in Hancock’s expedition was George Armstrong Custer and the 7 th cavalry. Hancock’s expedition set out in April for western Kansas, and began on a rocky note from the start. Meeting first with Dog Soldier chiefs on April 12 th , Hancock demanded they cease hostilities. On April 14th, many Cheyenne and Lakota women and children in nearby villages escaped, fearing another massacre such as that that had occurred at Sand Creek in 1864. On April 15 th , Lt Colonel George Armstrong Custer and his 7th Cavalry were ordered to pursue the fleeing Cheyennes and Lakotas. While in their villages they heard word of the 7th Cavalry approaching, causing a panic. Chief Roman Nose ordered his people to remain silent, and the Cheyenne used the undulating terrain of the region to conceal their movements, resulting in a fruitless pursuit for Custer. Furthermore, the Cheyennes had skillfully used the waterways like a highway to outmaneuver the enemy. For General Hancock, his expedition seemed doomed from the start. Fighting an enemy they poorly understood, in a region they were not familiar, coming to grips with the Dog Soldiers would prove a daunting task.

April 19th, 1867 On April 19 th George Armstrong Custer and his 7 th Cavalry arrived at Fort Hays in Kansas after a relatively fruitless pursuit of the retreating Cheyennes. Custer arrived expecting a large amount of supplies and provisions for his soldiers, but unfortunately he found Fort Hays was barren and provided little for his hungry troopers. Desertion began occurring during the month of April. By the end of the month 65 men had deserted from the 7 th Cavalry. Meanwhile, on the same day, and over 50 miles to the southwest of Fort Hays, General Hancock and the bulk of the expedition were facing a different dilemma. Against the protests of Indian Agent Edward Wynkoop, Hancock decided to destroy an abandoned village of Cheyenne and Lakota tipis on the banks of the Pawnee Fork. Relations between the military and the Indian Department were already on loose footing, and the disagreement between Hancock and Wynkoop continued the tension. Around 300 lodges, many already looted by the soldier’s, were burned to the ground on Hancock’s order. Upon hearing of the news, several Cheyenne chiefs who were contemplating peace with the whites became angry. As a result Cheyenne retaliation would occur throughout the summer of 1867. Reports also mentioned a small party of six Cheyennes from Black Kettle’s band who were visiting the village on the Pawnee Fork before it was destroyed. Upon the soldier’s approach, the small group split up to escape, and a few were killed in the process, including a Cheyenne named One Bear. Black Kettle, a Cheyenne peace chief, had steadfastly maintained peace even after the Sand Creek Massacre. He had intentionally moved his village to the south of the Arkansas River in Kansas, many miles away, to avoid the conflict.

April 24th, 1867 After the destruction of the Cheyenne village on the Pawnee Fork, General Hancock sent his expedition, minus the 7 th Cavalry, to Fort Dodge Kansas. There he attempted a council with Kiowa chiefs Kicking Bird and Stumbling Bear on April 23 rd . Both expressed their willingness to meet with Hancock due to their close distance to Fort Dodge and the nearby Arkansas River. Meanwhile, many Cheyenne who had fled from Hancock’s expedition had fled south of the Arkansas Rover. Both Kiowa Chiefs expressed their interest in maintaining peaceful relations and remaining in villages south of the Arkansas River - which included southwestern Kansas and western Oklahoma. Hancock’s meeting was intended to use the Kiowa and Apaches as allies while placing the blame on the Cheyenne.

On April 23 rd Hancock also received word of the theft of 11 mules from a station at the Cimarron Crossing. Hancock initially blamed the incident on the Cheyenne, but no direct evidence could be gathered that indicated they had done the theft. In a report later in May, Hancock himself admitted no evidence was available to confirm it was Cheyenne who has stolen the mules. Hancock would remain at Fort Dodge for a few more days, contemplating his next move while continuing to hold council with Kiowa and Arapahoe chiefs.

May 3 rd, 1867 May 3rd, 1867, was a time of entertainment for the 7 th cavalry as General Hancock’s expedition came into Fort Hays. Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s regiment, having spent several days at Fort Hays dealing with a shortage of rations and high desertion rates, was now hosting a contest for the fastest men in the 7 th cavalry.

Partly as a diversion for his men, and partly as entertainment for General Hancock, Custer used the opportunity as a way to possibly boost soldier morale. But after the festivities were over the two met to discuss plans for the future.

After having meetings with various Kiowa and Arapaho chiefs while at Fort Dodge in late April of 1867, Hancock decided upon reuniting his expedition with Custer at Fort Hays to the north. Hancock was bringing much needed relief to Custer’s regiment, but Hancock was also meeting with Custer to plan future attacks on the dog soldiers.

Although the merriment of the occasion began with a footrace by men of the 7 th , Hancock was more focused on why Custer had done so little in pursuit of the Dog Soldiers while at Fort Hays. Custer wrote to his wife Libbie on May 2 nd about the Dog Soldiers – “ Woe to them if I overtake them. The chances of this, however, are slight, once they are forewarned. ” Contrary to Hancock’s determination, Custer’s analysis would prove prophetic.

May 13th, 1867 With General Hancock’s expedition temporarily on hold in May of 1867 (and Custer confined to Fort Hays), Thomas Murphy (Central Superintendency of Indian Affairs) wrote a letter to Commissioner of Indian Affairs N.G. Taylor. Thomas Murphy wrote about how some felt regarding Hancock’s expedition into Kansas:

“General Hancock’s expedition, I regret to say, has resulted in no good, but on the contrary has been productive of much evil. It would have been far better for the interest of all concerned had he never entered the Indian Country with his soldiers. Indians who at the time he got into their Country were peaceable and well disposed toward the whites, are now fleeing with their women and children. No one knows where to and what the final result will be is doubtful.”

June 1st, 1867 After a long delay at Fort Hays in the spring of 1867, Lt Colonel George Armstrong Custer finally set out to find Cheyennes warriors and other Dog Soldiers on June 1 st . Custer’s delay was caused by a host of excuses, possibly to prevent any wrath from his superior, General Winfield Hancock. For example, spring storms had inundated the plains, desertions ran high in the 7 th , and scurvy was rampant. On a personal level, Custer’s wife Libbie had arrived for a visit - possibly affecting Custer’s commitment to move out (and leave her behind). A soldier with Hancock’s expedition left several notes on these events in early June of 1867. With the elaborate name of Carl Julius Adolph Hunnius, he provided an enlisted man’s view of what was going on at the time. He mentions some of the challenges Custer faced, such as scurvy and high desertion rates. His mention of Kiowa chief Satanta is mentioned as “ June 1 - Sa-tan-ta; stampedes animals at Ft. Dodge ”. This is verified also from other reports from the time as well. Although disjointed, his notes provide a valuable window into the events of early June, 1867. Transcriptions:

Sa-tan-ta (Kiowa Chief makes great talk. Genl H given Sa-tan-ta , Maj. Genl [XXX] [XXXX] to gain [time].

(June 1 - Sa-tan-ta; stampedes animals at Ft. Dodge) Ft. Larned & Ft. Hays (old) due N. [XXX] 2 days. Men have scurvy, Buffalo [hunted] , wild onions, many Deserters , with horse and each of 7th Cav. Scouts reports about 500 Indians near [XXXX] Sta. and [Dawner’s] Sta. Supposed Cheyennes.

June 1st Genl Custer left Ft. Hays for Ft. McPherson on Platte River then to Fort Sedgwick [XXXX] down S. to Ft. Wallace.

June 24th, 1867 For three weeks in June of 1867, Lt Colonel George Armstrong Custer and his 7 th Cavalry had been on a wild goose chase looking for Cheyenne and Lakota “Dog Soldiers”, who were responsible for raids throughout western Kansas. With Custer’s wife Libby being left behind (but with the protection of soldiers), Custer’s journey with his men took him north to Nebraska, and back south again from Fort McPherson. With inconclusive results so far, Custer was surprised on the morning of June 24 th by a group of Dog Soldiers led by a warrior by the name of Pawnee Killer. On the North Fork of the Republican River in south-west Nebraska, the 7 th Cavalry had a running fight lasting most of the day. At one point during the battle, Captain Louis Hamilton (and Custer’s own brother Tom) followed a group of Dog Soldiers and became separated from the rest of the regiment. By the time Custer arrived with help, Hamilton and his soldiers had already fought off several attacks and were safely heading back.

Between the battle action, Custer and his officer’s met with Pawnee Killer and a few warriors for a truce. The meeting was inconclusive, as both sides were trying to gather what the intentions of the other were. The Dog Soldiers were suspicious Custer was gathering information to attack the villages of their families, and Custer was suspicious the Dog Soldiers were planning to attack him at any moment. In a classic miscommunication typical during the plains wars, both sides were distrustful of the other; leading to no end in the cycle of violence.

June 26th, 1867 While Lt Colonel Custer’s expedition continued to probe through Nebraska and Kansas, an intense skirmish was raging to the south (well over 60 miles away) near Fort Wallace, Kansas. Custer left two of his companies behind in Kansas - one under Captain Albert Barnitz. The initial reason in being left behind was to protect railroad workers from Indian attacks. However, Barnitz and company G eventually made it to Fort Wallace. On the morning of June 26 th , Barnitz and his roughly 50 soldiers were surprised much like Custer was on June 24 th . They were surprised by Cheyenne and Lakota Dog Soldiers, who initially ran off the stock from Pond Creek Station – just to the west of Fort Wallace. Barnitz and his men pursued, eventually finding themselves outnumbered by as many as 200 Dog Soldiers. The Dog Soldiers changed their usual battle tactics of riding in a circle. In this battle they formed in a line, imitating their enemy and charging headlong into the soldiers. Barnitz himself was impressed by the “ magnificence of their display, as they sat with their plumed lances, their bows, and shields, and their gleaming weapons ”. The skirmish was considered a battle by Great Plains standards. Six U.S. Army soldiers were killed and six wounded. Barnitz described it as “quite a desperate little fight”. But like many of the clashes between the Cheyenne and U.S. military, the intention of these raids was not always known. As author William Chalfant deduces about the Dog Soldier intentions, “Their long-term strategy was a desperate hope to discourage the invaders and force them to take their roads and people away from their country. The fights at Fort Wallace and with the wagon train would be models for others to come”.

July 12th, 1867 On July 12 th 1867, the 7 th Cavalry began the day in north-western Kansas. They were in search of a missing group of soldiers under Lt. Lyman Kidder and were following what appeared to be the trail of Kidder and the ten men who had gone missing. The story of the missing soldiers actually began a few days earlier. After spending the last two weeks marching in the vicinity of the Republican River in Nebraska and Kansas, and having relatively fruitless results scouting the area, Custer was awaiting new orders which mysteriously did not show up - 2 nd Lt. Lyman Kidder was supposed to send Custer those orders. Kidder had left Fort Sedgwick (in western Colorado territory) with a small group of soldiers and a Lakota scout – specifically to find Custer and deliver him the orders. With dawn on July 12 th , Custer and his 7 th Cavalry set out following a trail believed to be that of Kidder and his men. As they followed it, tell-tale signs began to indicate what was in store for them. First a dead horse, then a second, and finally the stench of decaying flesh. Vultures overhead marked the spot of Kidder’s men. Custer relates what they found: “ all of the bodies found had been scalped and pierced with numerous arrows. As several days had elapsed since the massacre, and as the wolves had disfigured the remains very much it was impossible to determine whether any indignities or barbarities other than scalping had been perpetrated by the Indians .”

Clearly Kidder and his men met their demise from a war party. But which group had attacked them was a source of speculation. Custer first believed it was Sioux but later thought it Cheyenne. George Bent, half Cheyenne, later related the true story. On July 2 nd 1867, Lt. Kidder and his soldiers stumbled on a group of Cheyenne and Lakota warriors, and immediately the soldiers put themselves in a precarious position - in a gully, where the warriors had the advantage of elevation and numbers - as many as 100 Lakota and Cheyenne were reported to have attacked the soldiers. It was believed by Custer that Kidder’s party had possibly lost their original trail when they were attacked by the war party.

August 21st, 1867 On August 21-22, 1867, a group of Dog Soldiers noticed a scouting party of over 100 cavalrymen coming north from Fort Hays, Kansas. Near Prairie Dog Creek in north central Kansas, several hundred Dog Soldiers composed of Cheyenne and Lakota attacked the scouting party. The sharp skirmish lasted for two days, in which the scouting party returned to Fort Hays with roughly equal losses on both sides. The engagement was one of a number of skirmishes that occurred in Kansas in the summer of 1867, as Dog Soldiers attempted to defend their way of life. Most of the accounts of these engagements are from the perspective of the army, and few accounts are available from the Dog Soldiers themselves. However, a Cheyenne man named Johns Stands In Timber, who was born in 1882, recalls the Dog Soldier warrior band: “It became the most fearless warrior band ever organized in the history of the Cheyenne, because they sacrifice their lives for the behalf of the tribe. And then they go in, after they vow they are not coming back, one or (so) many, they pray ‘Let the people look at these men for the last time they are alive.’ The criers telling the people – ‘look at these men, they are vowed to sacrifice their lives for the people; they will never come back when the next battle occurs.’”

August 27th, 1867 On August 27 th 1867, General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding general of the United States Army, ordered a general court martial of Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer. The events of July and August of 1867 resulted in a whirlwind of controversy surrounding Custer.

In July of 1867, after expeditions in Kansas and Nebraska, Custer and his 7 th Cavalry arrived at Fort Wallace in western Kansas. Custer had arrived at the fort after discovering what was left of a small cavalry group under Lieutenant Kidder. Custer was at the fort because of orders from his superior, General Winfield Hancock. However, with Hancock’s absence, Custer decided to travel to Fort Harker nearly 200 miles away - on various pretenses.

Custer’s real priority was to be with his wife Libby who was at Fort Harker or Fort Riley. Many officers in his regiment already suspected Custer’s real intent. On July 15 th he set out from Fort Wallace to Fort Harker with 76 soldiers of the 7 th Cavalry. After several brushes with Dog Soldiers on their journey, the column made it to Fort Harker in the late evening of July 19 th . Custer awakened the commanding officer present, Colonel A.J. Smith. Smith was startled to see Custer present (expecting him to be at his post at Fort Wallace). Custer then told Smith he was on his way to Fort Riley, several hours riding distance to the east. Custer made it to Fort Riley to find Libby there in the early morning hours of July 19 th . Smith, meanwhile, was surprised to find out Custer had travelled with a large contingent of soldiers from Fort Wallace to Fort Riley - without orders. Smith placed Custer on arrest on July 22 nd , for neglecting his duty station at Fort Wallace (200 miles to the west). It was on August 27 th that General Grant ordered the court martial of Custer; to be scheduled in September at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

September 12th, 1867 On September 12 th , 1867, the decision was made to replace General Winfield Hancock - commander of the Department of the Missouri (and Custer’s superior), with General Phillip Sheridan. Hancock’s spring expedition in Kansas had achieved little in the way of progress with the Cheyenne. In fact, his destruction of a vacated Cheyenne village had created more enemies than friends.

General Phillip Sheridan would prove to be the mastermind of the Washita campaign a year later. What experiences influenced Sheridan? Before the Civil War, he had experience fighting Native Americans in the Pacific Northwest. During the Civil War, Sheridan had an active part. He led a Union army in the Shenandoah Valley campaign in 1864.

Part of his orders (given by General Ulysses S. Grant), were to "Give the enemy no rest…Do all the damage to railroads and crops you can”. This type of warfare, known as total war, was a technique used to hurry the conclusion to a long and bloody Civil War. It was a lesson Sheridan did not forget.

September 15th, 1867 Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s court martial of September 1867 is mired in controversy. Did he leave Fort Wallace because he was trying to obtain supplies? Or did he leave Fort Wallace because he had not received new orders? The more common reason was his urgency to see his wife. Other questions also remain. Was he court martialed because of jealous officers? Or court martialed as a scapegoat for Hancock’s failed expedition? It is important to look at the evidence. Custer’s wife offers telling evidence of why he left Fort Wallace from a letter she wrote to a friend, in September of 1867:

“ Autie [George Armstrong Custer] made the trip from Fort Wallace on horseback…He took a leave himself, knowing none would be granted him, and Genl. Hancock ordered his arrest. It sounds quite solemn to unaccustomed ears, but officers look on it as an ordinary occurrence, especially when one has done so little worthy of punishment as Aut has. When he ran the risk of a court-martial in leaving Wallace he did it expecting the consequences…and we are quite determined not to live apart again, even if he leaves the army otherwise so delightful to us .”

On September 15 th the court martial convened at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. On the next day Custer himself would be present to hear the charges against him.

On September 16 th , at Fort Leavenworth Kansas, Custer heard the main charges against him as they were read out loud in the courtroom:

“ Charges and Specifications preferred against Bvt. Maj. Gen. G.A. Custer, Lieut. Colonel 7 th U.S. Cavalry.”

Specification first . In this, that he, Brevet Major General G.A. Custer, Lieut. Col. 7 th U.S. Cavalry, did at or near Fort Wallace, Kansas, on or about the 15 th day of July 1867, absent himself from his command without proper authority, and proceed to Fort Harker, Kansas, a distance of 275 miles, this at a time when his command was expected to be actively engaged against hostile Indians .”

Specification first . In this, that he, Bvt. Major General G.A. Custer, Lieut. Col. 7 th Cavalry, immediately after the troops of his command had completed a long and exhausting march, and when the horses belonging thereto had not been rested, and were in an unfit condition for said service, did select a portion of such command consisting of three Commissioned officers, and about seventy five men with their horses, and did set out upon and execute a rapid march from Fort Wallace, Kansas, to Fort Hays in the same state; the said march being upon private business, and without proper authority or any urgency or demand of public business; and in so doing did seriously prejudice the public interest by overmarching and damaging the horses belonging to the said detachment of his command .”

“ Specification second . In this, that he, Brevet Major General G.A. Custer, Lieut. Col. 7 th Cav., while executing an unauthorized journey on private business from Fort Wallace, Kansas to Fort Harker in the same state, did procure at Fort Hays in the same state, on or about the 17 th July, 1867, (two ambulances and) four mules belonging to the United states, and did use such (ambulances and) mules, for the conveyance of himself and part of his escort from said Fort Hays to Fort Harker in the aforesaid state .”

“ Specification third . In this that he Bvt. Maj. General G.A. Custer, Lieut. Col. 7 th U.S. Cav. when near Downer’s Station in the state of Kansas, on or about the 16 th day of July 1867, after having received information that a party of Indians had attacked a small party detached from his escort near said Station, did fail to take proper measures for the repulse of said Indians, or the defense or relief of said detachment; and further, after the return of such detached party did neglect to take any measures to pursue such party of Indians, or recover or bury the bodies of those of his command that had been killed as aforesaid ” –

September 17th-28th, 1867 Custer’s trial continued throughout the week of September 17 th – 28 th , 1867. Numerous officers of Custer’s 7 th Cavalry testified to be being present with Custer during his ill-fated expedition across Kansas. Two notable young officers who testified were Captain Louis Hamilton and Lieutenant William Cooke. Even the units acting assistant surgeon, Dr. Coates, also testified to Custer’s treatment of deserters who were shot on Custer’s orders. However vilified Custer may have been, some of those who testified were still loyal to Custer, and testified out of military obligation (Custer’s own brother Tom had testified about Custer shooting deserters). Custer himself did not take the stand during the trial, and had to await the results as the trial would be postponed until October 2 nd , 1867.

October 5th, 1867 Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer’s court martial continued after a hiatus of a few days, on October 5 th , 1867. Major Joel Elliott, Custer’s second in command, testified as a witness on the part of the prosecution. Several questions asked to Elliott dealt with the offenses Custer was accused of. The first set of questions asked to Elliott related to Custer’s treatment of deserters the previous July (note Custer is referred to by his prior Civil War rank of general):

“Q. Were you with your regiment or a portion thereof on the march from the Platte River to Ft. Wallace in July last?

A. There were some men deserted from the 7 th Cav. At the place where we had halted, and there were orders given by the commanding officer, Gen. Custer, to go out and bring them in, or arrest them or stop them - I don’t recollect the first order. Just as I started the General said to me, ‘I want you to shoot them’, or words to that effect. I was not ordered to go out. I asked Gen. Custer to allow me to go out after those deserters, and I think it was just as I was in the act of mounting horse that I received the order to shoot them.

A. They halted at the first order to halt, and two threw their arms down at the first order to throw them down.

A. I saw none with him.” The next set of questions dealt with the condition of the horses of the 7 th Cavalry before Custer’s expedition from Fort Wallace to Fort Harker. This was a point of contention for the prosecution - because Custer supposedly had left fort Wallace not only without leave, but also with army horses in no condition to undertake a new journey: “Q. What was the condition of the horses, as far as you know, when the command arrived at Fort Wallace?

Q. Had the horses of the command been rested sufficiently to take a march of a hundred or two miles a day or two after that?

October 11th, 1867 On October 11 th , 1867, Lt. Colonel George Armstrong Custer was no doubt contemplating the verdict of his court martial. For nearly a month Custer was on trial for a variety of offenses - most notably being absent without leave and the shooting of deserters. On October 11 th , the court went into deliberation and finally came up with a verdict.

However, before the verdict, Custer was allowed to provide a written defense. Custer prepared an ornate, lengthy defense about being absent from his command. One of the first paragraphs read as follows:

“ Of the first stage of that journey, viz.: from Fort Wallace to Fort Harker, I have to say that I accomplished it on account of what I believed to be, and had just cause to believe to be, urgent public business. And of the second I have to say that I went to Fort Riley with the full knowledge and consent of Bvt. Maj. Gen. Smith, my immediate commanding officer. In support of the first proposition the following account of the operation of my command is submitted. The Court will see that it is certified by the evidence on the record .”

Custer further elaborated on the nature of his orders when he arrived at Fort Wallace in July of 1867:

“ Now, Gentlemen, it is proper to come to judgement. My orders were before me. I was directed to report to Gen. Hancock. Fort Wallace was the point named where it was expected, it seems, to meet him, under the supposition that I would receive my orders a week earlier than I did. But even, as if to provide for an unforeseen failure, Fort Wallace was not named as the point where I should report to him. On the contrary I was ordered to proceed with all my command in search of Indians towards Fort Wallace and report to General Hancock. Weather he were at Wallace or Denver or Harker, at one of which, or between two of which, he was then .”

The Judge Advocate, Captain Robert Chandler, then proceeded to reply to Custer’s written defense. Chandler emphasized the evidence and eyewitness testimony that had been heard throughout the trial, generally brushing off any argument Custer made in his defense. With Chandler’s reply finished, the court was then cleared for deliberations.

Custer was found guilty of five of the charges and specifications found against him. The result of the verdict by the court was as follows:

“ In consequence the Court sentenced Brevet Major General G.A. Custer, Lieutenant Colonel, 7 th U.S. Cavalry, to be suspended from rank and command for one year, and forfeit his pay for the same time .”

October 13th, 1867 With Custer’s trial winding down in October of 1867, a more important event that would affect relations between whites and Native Americans was about to take place. The goal of the event was to solve a monumental question, one that still resonates with us today. How to create a lasting peace with Native Americans? A seemingly contradictory goal - when Manifest Destiny was the paramount objective for the United States at the time. The Cincinnati Gazette at the time was blunt on the matter “ The facts are obvious and men are either idiots or knaves who do not see that nothing short of the strong arm of the government will subdue these demons of the plains .” During the summer of 1867, Senator John Henderson perhaps spoke for much of the country on what to do about the conflict on the Great Plains. The senator presented a bill in Congress “ To treat with certain hostile Indians…now warring with the United States or committing depredations .” The senator’s goal was to create a peace commission to create an agreement to “ remove the causes of war; secure the frontier settlements and railroad construction; and establish a system for civilizing the tribes .” The peace commission outlined eventual goals – the settlement of the land, and the “civilizing” of Native Americans. A large contingent of peace commissioners was formed, composing of officials such as the Commissioner of Indian Affairs N.G. Taylor, a large number of senior army officers, and Senator John Henderson himself. They were accompanied by a retinue of members of the press and an escort of soldiers. On the 13 th of October, 1867, the long column of 165 wagons made its way (with trepidation) to meet with Indians of the Great Plains for peace. The meeting for this great council would occur near Medicine Lodge Creek in south-central Kansas.

October 19th, 1867 Black Kettle was in a precarious position. One of many Cheyenne chiefs, Black Kettle was a firm believer that peace with the whites would be the only answer to peace on the Great Plains. He was also risking his own personal safety and that of his family in taking this stance.

With many of the Great Plains Indian Tribes being notified of an important council to occur at Medicine Lodge Creek in Kansas, Black Kettle was determined to create a lasting peace for his people. In September and October of 1867, Black Kettle was ridiculed by many Cheyenne for believing in peace. In some cases he and his family were even threatened with harm; usually such threats coming from the militant Cheyenne Dog Soldiers.

Despite this, Black Kettle was one of the first chiefs present to warmly welcome the officials and dignitaries who were there to begin peace talks. The peace commissioners were composed of military officers, Indian agents, reporters, and an escort of 500 soldiers of the 7 th Cavalry. The Medicine Lodge Council, as it would be known, would begin in south central Kansas. The great council was a meeting place for many Native Americans – possibly as many as 5,000 people were present. Along with Black Kettle and the Cheyenne, there were Arapaho, Comanche, Kiowa, and Apache tribes. The atmosphere was tense for both sides, as a grand council began on October 19 th with Black Kettle and White Head being the only Cheyenne chiefs present. However, with so few Cheyenne present for the talks, Black Kettle remained largely silent. His ultimate hope was to bring more Cheyenne chiefs to his side. He would spend the next few days attempting to do just that.

October 27th, 1868 On the morning of October 27 th , 1868, with the Medicine Lodge Treaty continuing for several days, an unexpected sight greeted the contingent of peace commissioners and newspaperman present. It was Black Kettle, who had disappeared for a few days; he now arrived at the head of a large number of Cheyenne warriors and chiefs. A newspaper correspondent at the time described the scene:

“ Five columns of a hundred men each, forty paces apart, dressed in all their gorgeous finery. Crimson blankets about their loins, tall comb-like headdresses of eagle feathers, variegated shirts, brass chains, sleigh bells, white, red and blue bead-worked moccasins, gleaming tomahawks, made up the personnel of a scene never to be forgotten .”

“ Their chief, Mo-ko-va-ot-o, or Black Kettle, mounted upon a wiry horse, sprang forward, dressed in a dingy shirt and dingier blanket, his long black hair flowing behind him like a bashaw’s tail, and waved his hands. In most admirable order they moved by the left flank by divisions; another wave and they marched obliquely across the Neo-contogwa-up to within 50 yards of Commission Camp, where they halted, but still continued their lively exhilarating chant until the commission appeared in full dress and halted within a few paces of the line .”

October 28th, 1867 The previous day, October 27 th , 1867, Black Kettle arrived with a large number of Cheyennes to engage in peace treaty talks. The next morning, Cheyenne and Arapaho Chiefs gathered to hear Senator John Henderson begin. The senator emphasized that that they would have to give up their land between the Arkansas and South Platte Rivers (parts of Kansas and Nebraska). However, to the chiefs present, this was unacceptable. Buffalo chief was quoted as saying “ We never claimed any land south of the Arkansas, but that country between the Arkansas and the South Platte is ours .” By all accounts, the senator was eager to get the treaty signed that day. Seeing the chiefs’ determination to keep the land, Senator Henderson took some of them aside with an interpreter. He told them they could hunt north of the Arkansas River, but would still have to reside permanently south of it. Although the promise was made, it was not stated in the treaty document that the chiefs would sign. When it was brought up by correspondent William Fayel that the wording of the treaty be changed to reflect Henderson’s promise, Henderson responded “ It’s no time for bickering ”. Pleased with the compromise, many of the Cheyenne chiefs joined in the signing of the treaty - including Black Kettle. Not all chiefs were eager to sign the treaty. Little Robe, who had expressed anger two days before, declared the treaty had enough signatures. It took some cajoling to get the other Cheyenne chiefs to sign as well. Afterwards, presents were given to them by the peace commissioners; these included cast iron weapons of inferior quality. One pistol was tested by a Cheyenne and it exploded in his hands! Nonetheless, the Cheyennes and Arapahoes had agreed to and signed the treaty. Other treaties at Medicine Lodge were also completed with the Comanche, Kiowa, and Apaches. October 28 th , 1867, however, would mark the last time the United States negotiated a treaty with the Southern Plains tribes.

November 12th, 1867 With the end of the Medicine Lodge Treaty in October of 1867, Captain Barnitz of the 7 th Cavalry, who was present during the treaty signing, wrote in his journal a poignant entry regarding all that had transpired in late October: “ After the council the Cheyennes were with great difficulty persuaded to sign the treaty. They were superstitious in regard to touching the pen, or perhaps supposed that by doing so they would be ‘signing away their rights’ – which is doubtless the true state of affairs, as they have no idea that they are giving up, or that they have ever given up the country which they claim as their own, the country north of the Arkansas. The treaty all amounts to nothing, and we will certainly have another war sooner or later with the Cheyennes, at least, and probably with the other Indians, in consequence of misunderstanding of the terms of present and previous treaties .”

November 20th, 1867 On November 20 th 1867, George Armstrong Custer’s wife Libby wrote a letter to her cousin (Rebecca Richmond) from Fort Leavenworth, mentioning the aftermath of his court martial: “ Armstrong has received official notice - He had already heard by telegram - the sentence is unjust as possible. Autie merits acquittal. Suspension from rank and command; forfeiture of pay proper for a year. It does not disturb us, for now we can be together for a year and a half, for the next Indian campaign (which he will not participate in) will be over in the summer, it is believed, and by the expiration of his sentence all will be in winter quarters.

Pay proper is $95. a month, but a soldier’s emoluments amount to more than his pay, so that we have enough to live on. We have bought a new carpet for the front room, and put the old one in your bedroom. We anxiously await a telegram announcing your arrival. Autie and I are the wonder of the garrison, we are in such high spirits .”

January 12th, 1868 The winter of 1867-68 was not always a time of rest on the Great Plains. For a small band of Cheyenne and Arapaho warriors, January 12 th 1868 was a time to raid for much needed supplies. On that day, twenty five warriors attacked a government wagon train near the Cimarron Crossing in west-central Kansas. According to reports, they acted in an aggressive manner, taking supplies from the wagon train. However, for many Cheyennes and Arapahos, it was a difficult winter in which promised government rations did not always arrive promptly. According to Indian agent Edward Wynkoop, many Cheyennes and Arapahos were starving before the arrival of rations in the spring. Even so, the brief winter raid would be an indication of what was to come in the summer of 1868.

January 14th, 1868 After the signing of the Medicine Lodge Treaty in October of 1867, those peace commissioners who were present began a report of their findings. To them, the Medicine Lodge Treaty was of great importance in creating a lasting peace on the Great Plains. It was signed by many Great Plains tribes, such as the Comanche, Kiowa, Arapaho, and the Cheyenne. Although not having been present at the signing, General William T. Sherman (in charge of the military department affecting those tribes) would be among those who would assist in writing a report on the treaty. In addition, Indian Commissioner N.G. Taylor and Senator John B. Henderson of Missouri, who were present during the treaty signing, would also assist in the final report. On January 14 th , 1868, the report was formally published after having been submitted to the President, Andrew Johnson. The report was lengthy and included a recent history of Native Americans on the Great Plains. It also acknowledged Sand Creek as a major cause of Dog Soldier attacks, by saying, “ it was here, under the pledge of protection, that they were slaughtered by the third Colorado and a battalion of the first Colorado cavalry under command of Colonel Chivington.” It further paints a broader picture that “ the Indian was forgotten. His rights were lost sight of in the general rush to these fountains of wealth .” However sympathetic the report may have sounded, it also accepted the reality of Manifest Destiny. “ We do not contest the ever-ready argument that civilization must not be arrested in its progress by a handful of savages. And we fully recognize the fact that the Indian must not stand in the way of this result .” The finality of the report was by no means conclusive. The commissioners offered a multitude of answers to the cessation of conflict on the Great Plains. Among them were departmental changes – consolidating authority in one department over another. Indeed, some suggestions were purely administrative. Perhaps the most useful suggestion was that “ no governor or legislature of States or Territories be permitted to call out and equip troops for the purpose of carrying on war against Indians .” This, no doubt, was a lesson learned from Sand Creek. Finally, the report had the idealistic injunction “ To maintain peace with the Indian, let the frontier settler treat him with humanity, and railroad directors see to it that he is not shot down by employees in wanton cruelty .”

May 17th, 1868 Life in the 7 th Cavalry was often a time of tedium punctuated with the constant threat of violence. On May 17 th , 1868, Captain Albert Barnitz of the 7 th Cavalry wrote to his wife about these conditions on the Great Plains: “We have ice delivered every day, at 3 cts per lb. Our suttler has arrived, and opened part of his stores. He has one tent 43 feet long for a store room and another a hospital tent, which looks small in comparison with the first, -being not quite half as large, -as a place of resort for the officers, who are supposed to be fond of beer! I don’t expect to frequent it very much, if at all, so you needn’t be alarmed for fear I will become addicted to beer! You see we are not entirely away from civilization, as we were last Summer, and I really think we will have a very pleasant Summer, if the Indians don’t become hostile, -but I am not at all confident in their good intentions, even yet, and so I do not dare to hint that it may be possible for you to come out presently, -in a month or two – for fear something should occur to make me wish that I had not done so.”

July 7th, 1868 In response to growing Cheyenne and Arapaho raids in July of 1868, General William Tecumseh Sherman (commander of the Military Division of the Missouri), in writing to his subordinate - General Phillip Sheridan, issued an edict that if the Cheyennes and Arapahos “ resort to acts of war, you have no alternative but to punish them as a whole tribe .” This doctrine ran counter to some, including Indian Agent Edward Wynkoop, who consistently defended them from his own first hand experiences. Clearly some Cheyennes and Arapahos were involved in the raiding and killing of settlers that summer, but many were not. Sherman’s edict underscored the urgency of tackling the conflict head on, without the time to carefully understand the nuance and complexity of the situation. It was under these rigid conditions that Edward Wynkoop would resign as an Indian Agent in October of 1868.

July 14th, 1868 On July 14 th , 1868, a group referring to itself as the United States Indian Commission created a heartfelt plea to Congress “ to call the attention of your Honorable bodies to the condition and treatment of our Indian tribes .” They acknowledged that “ It has long been the conviction of the humane amongst us, that our Aboriginal inhabitants have been the victims of great wrongs, cruelties and outrage; but it is only recently that the particular nature, the atrocious character, and the frightful results of these crimes have been brought distinctly before us. The recent reports of the Indian Peace Commissioners, and of the Joint Special Committee of the two Houses of Congress, have in some degree disclosed the nature and sources of them; and the disclosure is at once so painful and humiliating, as to call for the most prompt and vigorous measures of redress and remedy, for the reason that it concerns alike the honor and the interests of the nation ”. The entreaty continued, "We stand charged before the civilized world, by the testimony of our own witnesses, with having been ‘uniformly unjust to the Indians;’ and it is stated by Gen. Sherman and his associate commissioners, that this injustice has been the cause of all the wars which they have waged against us .”

"When after that night's march we were halted on the high plain and the General made the assignments for the attack, M Troop was ordered to dismount, and I being No. 4, it fell to my lot to hold the horses. So, I did not have part of the attack, but we could distinctly hear the firing and, I think, the yelling. We were able to tell when the firing was mostly over that the fighting was done.

We men began to clamor for a move to the scene. Our corporal in charge made a feeble objection at first, but on second thought yielded and we moved down into the valley. When we came in view of the yet distant tipis, they looked white, and I, surprise remarked, 'Why they have tents.' It was the first wigwams I had ever seen.

I do not know if we were the only troop that was dismounted during the onslaught, but I have often recalled my impression as to the very narrow escape we horse-holders had on that morning, for by the time we were in camp the Indians were swarming on the bluffs around us, and if we hadn't become restless our corporal might have kept us there just a little too long..."

"Attempting to ascend the bluffs at one point, Maj. [Joel H.] Elliott was fearful that we were to close to the Indian village, and that the Indians would either hear our horses crushing through the snow or else see us outlined against the sky, and so he countermarched the column (no orders were given, exceot by signs or in a low tone) and ascended the bluffs at a point more remote from the village. We now moved on until we were behind a towering bluff, which rose on our right, about, as we supposed, opposite the point on the stream where the village was located. Here Major Elliott halted the command and requested me to go with him to the summit to make observations; we dismounted, and leaving our horses with an orderly, climbed to the top of the bluff and lying down on the snow, looked down into the valley below and endeavored to make out the location of the village (which, as we afterwards found, was directly in front of us on the stream below, and no more than half a mile distant), but the night was so dark that we could see nothing except the dark outline of the timber along the stream."

"While the roundup was progressing I observed a group of dismounted Indians escaping down the opposite side of the valley. Completing the roundup, and starting them toward the village, I turned the herd over to Lieutenant Edward Law who had come with the second platoon of the troop and told him take them to the village, saying that I would take my platoon and go in pursuit of the group I had seen escaping down the valley.

Crossing the stream and striking the trail, I followed it till it came to a wooded draw where there was a large pony herd. Here I had found the group had mounted. Taking the trail which was well up on the hillside of the valley, and following it about a couple of miles, I discovered a lone tipi, and soon after, two Indians circling their ponies. A high promontory and ridge projected into the valley and shut off the view of the valley below the lone tipi.

I knew the circling of the warriors meant an alarm and rally, but I wanted to see what was in the valley below. Just then Sergeant [Levi] Connor, who had been a captain of the Ohio volunteers, and [First] Sergeant Hughes [Higgins], who had served in the 4th U.S. Cavalry in that country before the Civil War, came to me and warned me of the danger of going ahead. I ordered them to halt the platoon and wait till I could go to the ridge to see what was beyond. Arriving at and peering over the ridge, I was amazed to find that as far as I could see down the well wooded, tortuous valley there were tipis. Not only could I see tipis, but mounted warriors scurrying in our direction. I hurried back to the platoon and returned at the trot till attacked by the hostiles, when I halted, opened fire, drove the hostiles to cover, and then deployed the platoon as skirmishers.

The hillsides were cut by rather deep ravines and I planned to retreat from ridge to ridge. Under the cavalry tactics of 1841, the retreat of skirmishers was by the odd and even numbers, alternating in lines to the rear. I instructed the line in retreat to halt on the next ridge and cover the retreat of the advance line. This was successful for the first and second ridge, but at the third I found the men and apparently forgotten their numbers and there was some confusion, so I divided the skirmishers into two groups, each under a sergeant, and thereafter had no trouble.

Finally, the hostiles left and we soon came to the pony herd where the group we had started to pursue had mounted. I had not a single casualty. During this retreat we heard heavy firing on the opposite side of the valley, but being well up on the side hills we could not see through the trees what was going on. There was a short lull when the firing again became heavy and continued till long after we reached the village, in fact, nearly all day."

In the decades before the Civil War the US government regarded Indian tribes as sovereign and independent nations and sought ways to remove them from coveted lands as well as protect them against white encroachment. Congress devised a reservation policy that called for concentrating the Indians on small, well defined tracts of land that legislators believed would be free from white intrusions. Some Plains tribes accepted life on reservations; others did not, continuing to hunt and live on traditional lands outside the reservations. This choice produced little conflict until the 1860s, when the harsh realities of Manifest Destiny saw more and more gold-seekers and land-hungry settlers penetrate the Plains and encroach on tribal hunting grounds. Unable to retreat beyond the reach of whites, many tribes, including the Cheyenne and Arapaho, decided to defend their freedom rather than submit to reservation life.

This led to attacks on wagon trains, stagecoaches, mining camps, and settlements, creating conditions that brought about the Sand Creek Massacre in 1864. Although the government repudiated Sand Creek and promised reparations to the Cheyenne in the Treaty of Little Arkansas (1865), both sides changed violations, and hostilities continued. When the Treaty of Medicine Lodge (1867) failed to end widespread Indian raids, Maj. General Philip H. Sheridan, commanding the Department of the Missouri, prepared a bold and inventive winter campaign designed to catch the Indians when least mobile and most vulnerable. Among those targeted for destruction were the allied Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Kiowa tribes reported to be encamped in the Washita River valley.

Events leading to the attack at Washita River began on November 29, 1864, when troops under the command of Col. John Milton Chivington attacked and destroyed Black Kettle's village on Sand Creek, 40 miles from Fort Lyon, Colorado Territory. At the time, Black Kettle had been pursuing a policy of peace with whites and believed his village to be under US Army protection. Black Kettle survived the attack, but at least 150 Cheyenne and Arapaho men, women, and children were killed and horribly mutilated. It came to be known as the Sand Creek Massacre and resulted in a massive public outcry as well as months of retaliatory raids by Cheyenne, Arapaho, and Lakota warriors.

When the army failed to end the raids, a federal commission was created to make peace with the raiding tribesmen. By the terms of the Treaty of Little Arkansas , signed on October 17, 1865, and the Treaty of Medicine Lodge of October 1867, the Cheyenne, Arapaho, and other tribes agreed to stop their raiding and settle on reservations in Indian Territory (now Oklahoma). There they were to receive permanent homes, agricultural implements, weapons and ammunition for hunting, and annuities of food, blankets, and clothing. The treaties did not bring peace. Many tribal officials refused to sign. Some who did sign had no authority to compel their people to comply with such agreements. And Congress was slow to ratify the treaties and annuities often failed to arrive. Warrior societies, mostly young men violently opposed to reservation life, continued hostilities.

Sheridan, commanding the Department of the Missouri, adopted a policy that "punishment must follow crime." Frustrated that more traditional campaigning methods failed to defeat the Plains warriors in the field, he prepared a winter campaign when Indian horses would be weak and unfit for all but the most limited service.

To this end, on November 23, 1868, Lt. Col. George Armstrong Custer set out from Camp Supply in Indian Territory with 689 7th US Cavalry troopers and a dozen Osage scouts. His objective: the Washita River Valley where some 6,000 - 8,000 Cheyenne, Arapaho, Kiowa, Comanche, and Plains Apache had laid out winter camps. Traveling through a foot of new snow, the command reached the Washita valley shortly after midnight on November 27 and silently took up positions near an Indian encampment the scouts had discovered at a bend in the river. Coincidentally, the village was that of Black Kettle, who had survived Sand Creek and who had tried so diligently to avoid conflict.

On the morning of November 27, 1868, the fight began with a rifle shot, a bugle sounding "Charge!" and a band playing the opening strains of "Garry Owen." In a moment all was tumult as the charging troopers of Lieutenant Colonel Custer's 7th US Cavalry came splashing across the frigid Washita River into the sleeping Cheyenne camp of Chief Black Kettle.

They came in four battalions. Custer led the largest straight into the village. Major Joel Elliott and Captains William Thompson and Edward Myers led the others northeast and southwest in an attempt to surround the encampment. While Custer watched from a knoll to the south, the soldiers drove the Cheyenne from their lodges barefoot and half-clothed and pursued them in all directions. Some of the warriors fought and died in the village; others took up positions behind trees and in ravines and returned fire; many of them escaped. The village's leader, Black Kettle, and his wife Medicine Woman Later, were killed by soldiers while trying to cross the Washita River. When the firing ceased two hours later, approximately 30 to 60 Cheyenne and 20 cavalrymen lay dead in the snow and mud.

Following Maj. General Philip H. Sheridan's plan to cripple resistance, Custer captures the village's pony and mule herds, 875 animals. Custer cuts out 225 animals and orders the killing of the rest. In accordance with the total war policy, Custer also ordered the burning of the Cheyenne lodges, with all their winter supply of food and clothing. Then, realizing that many more Indians were threatening attack from the east, Custer feigned an attack toward their downriver camps and quickly retreated to Camp Supply with his captives - 53 women and children.

The engagement at the Washita might have ended very differently if the larger Indian encampments to the northeast had been closer to Black Kettle's camp. The impact of losing winter supplies, plus the knowledge that cold weather no longer provided protection from attack, forced many bands to accept reservation life.

The most obvious inhabitant of Washita Battlefied is the plant community. The park is fortunate to be located in an ecoregion that straddles both tall and short grass prairie ecosystems. In addition, it is also a meeting ground for arid southwestern species and plants from the eastern deciduous forests. Hence, one can find Great Plains yucca and prickly pear cactus growing in a very close proximity to American elm, eastern redcedar, and black walnut.

The most prominent plant species at the site are the grasses, particularly little bluestem, switchgrass, and Indiangrass. These native bunchgrasses, when growing over large swaths of ground, ripple like ocean waves as afternoon breezes pass through.

Lending color to the grass palatte are numerous wildflowers, which create unexpected splotches of color here and there throughout the landscape. Depending on the season one will be certain to spy heather aster, silver golden aster, Indian blanket, prairie sunflower, Ohio spiderwort, or silky prairie clover. Adding to the color in the fall months, when the little bluestem turns a resplendent rust color, are the deep red of the smooth sumac and the bright yellow of the eastern cottonwood.